● PRIVATE BY DEFAULTLocal system
V1.28 · READ-ONLY PRODUCTION GATES

External Acceptance Gates

This checklist does not claim that agents, eBPF, SIEM failover, inline IPS, forensic acquisition, publisher datasets or independent certification have been accepted.

Evidence still required

The eight gates below remain unverified until field testing and independent assessment. There are no buttons here to execute privileged operations or upload private reports.

GateField evidence requiredStatus

Use the offline operator CLI to review requirements.

Operator commands: python tools/field_acceptance_v128.py, python tools/ebpf_preflight_v128.py --help and python tools/forensic_seal_v128.py --help.

V1.27 · LOCAL / READ-ONLY

Project Integrity Check

Review sampled project dataset files, geographic layers, SIEM archive hashes, and queued event hashes without exposing paths, raw records or credentials.

Bounded consistency scan

Read-only. It never repairs, deletes, quarantines, or uploads data. Larger projects may require multiple verification processes or separate signed inventories.

Select a project to begin.

Detected inconsistencies

A clean consistency scan does not certify forensic authenticity, completeness or data quality.

For operator-run checks across projects, use python tools/integrity_v127.py --help. Results never include source content.

V1.25 · READ-ONLY ASSURANCE

Sensor Liveness & Evidence Trust

Inspect passive IDS polling age and SIEM pending queue depth. The view does not retrieve raw logs, accept signing passwords, or run privileged commands.

Select a project for metadata-only checks.

Offline public-key evidence signatures

Use tools/assurance_v125.py keygen, sign, and verify from an operator terminal. The encrypted private key must be stored outside the project data directory. Verify the public-key fingerprint using an independently trusted channel.

Non-destructive disaster-recovery drill

Run tools/assurance_v125.py recovery-drill on an encrypted .ocsbackup file. It restores to a temporary directory, validates SQLite and evidence hashes, then removes the temporary copy. This is not a hardware or multi-host acceptance test.

V1.24 · OPERATIONS / RECOVERY

Passive IDS & Encrypted Disaster Recovery

Review project-scoped Suricata / Zeek local ingestion checkpoints. Logs are followed on Debian with an operator-only CLI; this view never changes sensor state or firewall rules.

Select a project to review local sensor progress.

Recovery stays outside the browser

Encrypted backups can contain telemetry and connector keys. Use tools/recovery_v124.py on Debian with a private passphrase. Verify snapshots and restore only to a new, empty directory. Stop project-file writers for consistent evidence copies.

This does not certify native agents, distributed failover, inline IPS, or forensic acquisition.

V1.23 · PRIVACY-MINIMIZED NATIVE SENSOR ADAPTER

Windows ETW / macOS EndpointSecurity Import

Import JSONL emitted by separately operated reference sensors. Preview before staging; raw command lines and usernames are discarded. This does not install or sign agents.

Select a local project and a JSONL file.
V1.13 · VERIFIED ANALYTICS & DEFENSIVE RESPONSE REVIEW

Parquet archive & incident playbooks

Export bounded monthly Parquet telemetry for local Arrow analytics. Simulate approved read-only incident playbooks without running external commands, changing a host, or sending project data off-server.

Parquet event archive

Parquet requires the optional PyArrow dependency on the Debian host. Files are retained and SHA-256 verified. Export never deletes local events.

Select a project and month.

Defensive incident playbook lab

No arbitrary commands, endpoint actions, network requests or automatically generated blocking rules. Results are preserved as local integrity-verifiable reports.

Select a project to begin.

Offline Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Import an authorized, locally supplied CISA-KEV-style JSON catalog. Files are hashed and preserved; origin authenticity is not confirmed by this application. CVE overlaps only identify leads for review.

No catalog selected.
V1.12 · VERIFIED RECORDS AND COMPARABLE STATISTICS

SIEM archive & Denmark statistical rates

Preserve bounded-memory, immutable monthly SIEM exports; review source gaps; and compare sourced municipality-level rates with small-cell suppression. Area codes and imported statistics are not independently verified.

SIEM collection quality

Choose a project.

Non-destructive event archive

Archived events remain in local SQLite storage. Export does not delete them.

Denmark crime-rate comparison

Import area-level aggregate JSON only. Supported category/measure codes come from the existing crime map. To protect small cells, non-synthetic counts below 5 are suppressed in comparisons. Relative colors do not identify where offenders live.

No rates loaded.
V1.11 · SINGLE-NODE INGESTION OBSERVABILITY

SIEM reliability & backpressure

Observe queue pressure, endpoint-source freshness and Debian worker history. All data stays in local project storage. Read-only except for manual append-only diagnostic snapshots.

Queue health

Select a project to inspect ingestion.

No local status yet.

Per-source inbox counts

Enrolled sensor freshness

Append-only queue snapshots

Recent Debian worker cycles

These are single-process observations, not HA throughput certification. The worker records bounded counters without storing raw event payloads in the metrics table.

V1.10 · LOCAL DEFENSIVE BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

Behavioral SIEM & source quality

Evaluate historical time-window patterns across authorized event sources and hosts. Saved evaluations are hash-verifiable. Leads are not proof of compromise; this workbench never blocks systems or executes scanners.

Event source quality

Select a project to inspect normalized security telemetry.

Define a bounded behavioral rule

Run and verify historical analysis

No evaluation yet.

Only the newest 5,000 matching events are inspected, with up to 100 leads retained. Observed event timestamps and host identities are not independently attested.

V1.9 · VERIFIED OFFLINE EVIDENCE

Unified findings & remediation triage

Deduplicate offline scanner findings, preserve every source report, record evidence-backed case decisions and detect recurrence. This does not run scanners or prove a system has been remediated.

Evidence intake

Select a project to load findings.

No report reconciled yet.

Deduplicated issues

Source & decision history

No finding selected.

Analyst triage

A resolved finding reopens when a new verified report contains it. Changes are recorded in append-only decision history, but local administrators can still alter files.

V1.8 · DEFENSIVE INTEGRATION LIBRARY

Security tools & report imports

Discover requested products, register a provider API link, and import existing assessment reports. This workspace does not install or execute third-party tools, credential extraction utilities, exploits, or C2 frameworks.

Catalog

Configure external tool profile

Link an external HTTP endpoint or an already saved API connector. No credentials are copied into this catalog; use API Integrations to manage keys.

Offline results import

Import a user-provided report (maximum 8 MiB). The original stays in the selected project with a SHA-256 hash. Findings are leads requiring analyst verification.

No report imported.

Imported evidence and findings

Verification not run.
v1.7 · DEBIAN / WINDOWS / macOS

Evidence & native sensor readiness

Review defensive acquisition, verify retained file evidence, and check archived municipality data. Native kernel EDR and inline IPS are not yet included.

Copy a regular evidence file

Select an absolute path on the Debian server (or whichever machine runs this backend). Only regular files, maximum 1 GiB; never block devices or memory.

No acquisition performed.

Capability verification

Kernel-level agents, inline IPS and third-party certification remain external requirements.

Agents can durably queue telemetry on Windows/Linux/macOS and forward through an SSH tunnel using the included agent-spool CLI.

Forensic evidence copies

No verification run.

98-municipality dataset quality

Enter a previously archived GeoJSON source snapshot ID. The validator checks 98 codes, geometry, file hash and metadata; it cannot certify official publisher currency.

No municipality snapshot selected.
v1.6 · DEBIAN / WINDOWS OPERATIONS

Reliable defensive ingestion

Review fair single-node project scheduling, and preview/import exported Windows Event XML into the local SIEM. No kernel drivers, packet interception or external sharing.

Debian worker fairness

Projects are rotated over time rather than limiting the worker to the first 100 projects. The Debian worker must be running for its cursor to advance.

No scheduler check yet.

Windows Event XML · metadata only

Export selected authorized Windows security events as XML (not binary EVTX). Raw EventData fields and rendered messages are excluded from SIEM events.

No XML import selected.

Archived Windows XML imports

Verification has not been run.
v1.5 · SOC OPERATIONS

SOC sensor & queue health

Review opt-in Suricata, Zeek, osquery, native-agent intake and the Debian worker heartbeat. Fresh telemetry does not establish protection or certification.

Operational status

Select a project to inspect the event queue and sensors.

Worker & data freshness

Worker heartbeat available only when ingestion_worker.py is running.

The Debian worker polls pre-enrolled enabled sensor files. Windows forwards over an operator-managed localhost SSH tunnel.

Registered sensors (no tokens or file paths)

Recent incoming source counts

Persistent SOC health notices

Locally retained queue, sensor and worker health findings. No emails or external notifications; a stopped worker requires an independent systemd watchdog. Acknowledgement does not hide an ongoing condition.

No SOC health evaluation yet.
Select and acknowledge a notice to see its transition history.
v1.2 · DEFENSIVE ANALYTICS

XDR, evidence and national GIS checks

Retrospective cross-host leads, read-only image examination and locally generated security-assurance evidence. These tools do not constitute kernel EDR, live IPS, or certification.

Cross-host XDR leads

No correlation run yet.

Read-only forensic disk image

Never mounts the image or writes to it.

Verified municipality layer activation

Provide a previously archived official or licensed GeoJSON snapshot. Requires 98 distinct numeric municipality codes and polygons before allowing activation. This does not independently validate the published edition.

No snapshot selected.

Internal security-assurance package

Produce a locally archived, hash-verifiable engineering evidence report for external security assessors. No certification is claimed.

Not yet checked.

Archived v1.2 reports

No verification run yet.
PERSONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER

Situational overview

One private workspace for local telemetry, research, integrations and security analysis.

● LOCAL MODE
Local projects
—
Saved on your computer
Data sources
—
Imported or captured
Research entities
—
Per-project records
Server uploads
0
No automatic external uploads

Quick actions

Begin with your own files and monitoring sources

↗

Engine status

Capabilities detected on your PC

SQLite metadataACTIVE
Parquet / ArrowCHECKING
DuckDB analyticsCHECKING
Endpoint snapshotAVAILABLE
Account registrationNOT REQUIRED
Built for local control. This version adds real local event ingestion and triage, but is not a production EDR, IDS/IPS or nationwide intelligence feed. Packet capture and external collection never activate automatically.
VERSION 0.9 · LOCAL PREVIEW
DURABLE LOCAL EVENT INBOX

Telemetry Pipeline

Queue authorized events, deduplicate, quarantine malformed records, promote into detections, and verify history archives.

Local and explicit. This is not a native live endpoint agent. Events are submitted manually or by an authorized client; the queue never silently deletes records. No cloud upload.
Pending
—
Processed
—
Quarantined
—

Stage JSON events

Process queue

Promote up to 250 pending events in one atomic transaction, applying detection and indicator rules. Failed processing stays pending for retry.

No batch processed yet.

Quarantined event references

Historical event snapshots

The hot event index is retained. Archives are separately hashed and may be verified at any time.

DEFENSIVE DETECTION DEVELOPMENT

Detection Lab

Validate a bounded Sigma-inspired JSON rule, preview matches, then install explicitly.

Portable detection rule (JSON)

Result and semantic limitations

Submit a rule to see a bounded preview.

Only one selection field, equals/contains/starts-with, supported log sources and no joins. Unsupported expressions are rejected, not silently translated. This is NOT full Sigma support.

DENMARK INTELLIGENCE · SOURCE CUSTODY

Provenance & Sources

Record source attribution, usage licensing, jurisdiction, publication dates and unmodified, hash-verified historical snapshots.

Source claims are not verification. This catalog does not automatically download national databases or certify their completeness. Geographic research is Denmark-focused; endpoint data covers the user's authorized systems.

Register source

Append a source snapshot

Source snapshot history

Compare verified source revisions

Compare two preserved source revisions without deleting older data. Results are aggregate counts, not personal records or location pins.

Comparison verifies both archived files locally.

Validate an archived Denmark dataset

Choose a Denmark source and revision above, then check the archived SHA-256 hash, file structure and basic mapping/privacy flags. This does not certify publication authenticity or licensed use.

No archived source validated yet.

Registered data sources

AUTHORIZED EVENT ANALYTICS · OFFLINE

SOC Correlation & Data Quality

Connect related local security events by host and observation time; examine source completeness and save verified run history.

Evidence leads, not verdicts. The three fixed temporal analyses cannot establish compromise or causality. They work only on up to 10,000 already imported local events, and never contact a remote sensor or change devices.
Events inspected
—
Missing host/source fields
—
Future-dated timestamps
—

Run temporal correlation

Archived report verification

Saved runs preserve the original analysis result and an audit entry; they do not change incident or crime records.

Event sequence findings

No correlation run yet.

Event types

Source coverage

Correlation run ledger

THREAT HUNTING · LOCAL DEFENSE

Saved Hunt Queries

Define reproducible conditions for authorized historical events and preserve dated run summaries.

Bounded and read-only. Up to eight AND conditions against normalized events. Runs are limited to 5,001 matching records and at most 200 returned rows. This is not a SIEM-wide query language or live detector.

Create hunt

Fields: host, source, username, remote_ip, domain, process, event_type, action, severity, file_path, command_line. Operators: equals, contains, starts_with.

Run saved hunt

No hunt executed.

Saved definitions

Matched event preview

Retrospective threat-indicator matching

Compare up to 5,000 stored events with current local IP, domain, and SHA-256 indicators. No network traffic or automatic alert creation.

No retrospective analysis run.

Historical hunt runs

NETWORK DEFENSE · OFFLINE FILES ONLY

PCAP Flow Workbench

Analyze metadata from local, authorized classic PCAP recordings without capturing or transmitting packets.

Privacy by default. Aggregated five-tuple flow summaries are stored locally. Original packet payloads are not retained. TCP SYN/RST and connection-diversity signals are review hints, not proof of malicious activity.

Analyze packet file

No file analyzed yet.

Historical network snapshots

Timestamped snapshots are append-only. Importing the same file again creates a separate historical record.

Packets read
—
Decoded packets
—
Distinct flows
—

Network flows

Top destinations

Review signals

COLUMNAR DATA & ANALYTICS

Data Explorer

Import datasets, preview events, and execute read-only SQL on the selected dataset.

Data ingestion

Local files only. Maximum 12 MiB / 100,000 rows per import in this starter.

No file selected

With PyArrow installed, imported data is converted to compressed Parquet. Without it, CSV / JSONL is transparently retained as a fallback.

Project datasets

Create or select a project to view its datasets.

SQL workbench

Data preview / query results

No dataset selected
Select a dataset to preview events.
USER-INITIATED COLLECTION

Local endpoint snapshot

Inspect visible processes and socket metadata from your own computer.

Permission-aware visibility. This is a single, user-requested psutil snapshot. OS limitations apply. It is not yet persistent EDR, Sysmon/ETW, eBPF, or full packet capture.
Visible processes
—
Visible connections
—
Acquisition mode
ON DEMAND

Running processes

Top visible processes by memory use
Click “Capture new snapshot” to collect.

Network connections

No snapshot collected.
DENMARK · SOURCE-ATTRIBUTED RESEARCH

Intelligence cases

Record companies, organizations, people, places, incidents and infrastructure from authorized sources.

Research entities

Each record includes its stated source and analyst notes.

No research entities yet.

Add an entity

Investigator-supplied records only. This starter does not retrieve citizen profiles, private registries, or restricted data. Personal information requires an appropriate legal basis and source entitlement.
DENMARK GEOSPATIAL WORKSPACE

Denmark map

Offline Natural Earth low-resolution boundary; add project pins and licensed GeoJSON infrastructure layers.

Shared map timeline

Applies to crime, infrastructure observations and time-tagged imported GeoJSON. Undated basemap layers remain visible.

LIVE · LOCAL DATA

“Live” refreshes records already received by this local installation every 20 seconds. It does not imply access to a live Danish police or court feed. Playback moves one calendar month per step.

OFFLINE · LOW-RESOLUTION BASEMAP
100%Drag to pan · scroll or pinch to zoom · arrow keys to pan

Project GeoJSON layers

No layers imported.

Danish data sources

External source sites open only when you click them. No remote tiles or feeds are loaded automatically.

DENMARK · PUBLIC COURT RESEARCH

Court decision index

Append-only, source-attributed, pseudonymized published case metadata; not an offender registry or a complete court database.

No court records loaded. Court decisions are not crime incident counts.

Append or import court decision references

CSV ingestion

Use data lawfully obtained from an official publication. Private addresses and alleged offender identity fields are not accepted.

Columns: case_reference, court_name, area_id, category, outcome, decided_on, published_on, source_name; optional summary, source_url, synthetic, supersedes_id.

OFFLINE SOFTWARE & INTELLIGENCE IMPORTS

Exposure & SBOM

Compare user-provided CycloneDX component manifests with user-provided advisories. Exact version matches are candidates for verification, not a vulnerability scan.

1 · Import CycloneDX JSON SBOM

Upload a software bill of materials you generated on authorized systems.

2 · Import sourced advisory CSV

Required columns: cve, product, version, severity, source_name; optional source_url, description.

Candidate exact-version matches

No background CVE feed, external target scan, or automatic inventory collection.

3 · Import STIX 2.1 indicators

Only exact-match IP, domain and SHA-256 STIX patterns are supported. Imported indicators join your project's existing IOC engine and apply to subsequently ingested events.

DEFENSIVE SECURITY ENGINEERING

Defense & Coverage

Local-only socket exposure review, asset inventory, sensor freshness, and mapped detections. No external scanning.

Passive local exposure review

An explicit click enumerates TCP listeners visible on this machine. A wildcard bind is a review signal, not proof that a port is internet-exposed or vulnerable. Nothing probes remote systems.

No snapshot captured in this session

Authorized asset register

Assets in this project

Sensor freshness watch

Set an expected event-source name and an arrival-time threshold. Stale is based on the last locally ingested event, not a direct sensor heartbeat.

Detection and event coverage

ATT&CK technique mappings describe selected detection rules. They do not certify comprehensive security coverage or successful detection.

Case event timeline

The timeline contains only alerts and evidence explicitly linked to the selected case plus case lifecycle records.

Import Windows and Linux logs

Use Security Operations → Import events for normalized CSV/JSONL, Suricata EVE, Zeek JSON, Windows Event/Sysmon JSON exports, osquery events and systemd journal JSON exports. Import is local and initiated by you; it is not a live kernel sensor.

LOCAL DEFENSIVE ANALYTICS

Threat hunting & coverage

Query normalized events from your locally indexed telemetry. Historical rule previews do not generate or change alerts.

Event search

Security timeline

Safe detection-rule replay

Checks current rule conditions against recent indexed events. No alerts are created; threshold/state behavior is not simulated.

THIRD-PARTY API HUB

API integrations

Register endpoints and local encrypted keys. GET and POST requests are sent only when you explicitly run them.

Saved API connections

No integrations configured.

Add an API connection

Secrets never appear in saved-connection lists. This does not contact the provider until you click a test or request.

API request workbench

Call a saved API with an optional relative route, query parameters or JSON body.

No request sent.

Manual requests are bounded and not added to project data automatically. Avoid entering personal or confidential data into untrusted services.

PLUG IN YOUR OWN ENGINE

AI & custom engine registry

Ollama, OpenAI-compatible endpoints, and your own HTTP/JSON engine. Local models and user-chosen remote GPU APIs are supported.

Saved engines

Register an engine to start.

Custom engines expose an HTTP JSON endpoint. Running arbitrary OS commands or untrusted plugin code from a web page is not supported.

Register engine

API keys are stored encrypted on the PC, not in browser storage. Do not expose this account-free localhost service publicly. Endpoint choice determines whether prompt data leaves your computer.

LOCAL OR USER-SELECTED REMOTE AI

AI workbench

Use any saved compatible AI or custom HTTP engine. You choose the prompt and the destination.

Explicit requests only · No auto upload
Select or register an engine to begin.

Model and GPU configuration

For a local model, connect to your Ollama or compatible server on this PC. For a remote API, save the endpoint and key in My Engines & Models. Your GPU or the remote provider's GPU runs the inference, not an OpenCyberSecurity hosting GPU.

No engine selected.

BRING YOUR OWN COMPUTE

GPU & compute

Check indicative local GPU tools and configure model backends. Remote GPU execution is provided by the API you choose.

Local capabilities

Not checked.

Command availability does not prove that drivers, device permissions, or models are working. Ollama supports CPU or an optional GPU layer setting. Other engine runtimes determine GPU allocation themselves.

Supported execution paths

CPUNo GPU required
Local NVIDIA / AMD / Apple GPURequires a suitable local model runtime
Remote GPU endpointUser-supplied API and credential
OpenCyberSecurity hosting GPUNOT REQUIRED
LOCAL CONTROL & PRIVACY

System settings

Your project data is managed locally without OpenCyberSecurity accounts.

Current system

Storage directory
—
Operating system
—
Parquet / Arrow
—
DuckDB
—
HTTP binding
127.0.0.1 only
Platform account
Not required
Default outbound connections
None; user-triggered connectors / AI only

Verified local backup and restore

Historical local records are preserved by append-only database tables, but a disk failure can still erase them. Create a complete local archive, verify SHA-256 hashes, and restore into a separate empty folder with:

python tools/backup_local.py create my-backup.zip
python tools/backup_local.py verify my-backup.zip
python tools/backup_local.py encrypt my-backup.zip my-backup.ocsenc
python tools/backup_local.py decrypt my-backup.ocsenc verified-backup.zip
python tools/backup_local.py restore verified-backup.zip restored-data

Plain ZIP backups are not encrypted. Use the optional AES-256-GCM backup encryption commands documented in README before sharing or storing sensitive archives. Restore refuses to overwrite a destination folder.

Security note: Do not expose the app's port directly to a public network. The interface is intentionally account-free and designed for loopback. Share data using a separately secured service, never by binding this no-login local instance to all network interfaces.
BRING YOUR OWN DATA · READ-ONLY

Database Studio

Import your own SQLite database, browse its table structure, and copy selected tables into project analytics.

Register uploaded SQLite database

Your file is copied to this project's local data folder. This preview does not modify the uploaded source and does not execute user SQL against it.

Current preview limit: 64 MiB per database and 25,000 rows per imported table. Additional engine drivers remain planned.

Browse a database

Available table schemas

Next database driver layers: PostgreSQL, MySQL/MariaDB, SQL Server, MongoDB, ClickHouse, GraphQL and user-provided drivers. The current database explorer handles user-uploaded SQLite; HTTP API connectors remain separately available.
V1.1 · DEFENSIVE & SOURCE-AWARE

Professional Security & Denmark Feeds

Explicit, local monitoring; forensic file inspection; verified PCAP metadata; Danish source revisions; and relationship graphs. No background surveillance or automatic remote access.

Cross-platform host visibility

Windows, Linux and macOS user-mode process and connection snapshot. First capture establishes a baseline; later captures stage observed differences.

No collection runs until explicitly initiated.

Forensic static triage

Inspect hashes and file signatures, and list ZIP metadata. Files are not executed or unpacked.

Up to 12 MiB per user-supplied file.

Offline NDR / PCAP review

Run metadata-based review on an existing imported PCAP flow snapshot; no active traffic interception or IPS enforcement.

No flow review performed.

Official Danish source retrieval

Fetch selected public publisher endpoints on your explicit request, preserving hashes and local history. These feeds are publication-based, not continuous police telemetry.

Requires network access and publisher availability. Create a matching source under Provenance & Sources first.

98-municipality coverage check

Validate a locally archived GeoJSON file for 98 distinct codes and administrative polygon geometry. This is not proof of official authenticity.

Choose an archived source revision first.

Sourced intelligence graph

Trace documented entity relationships within the current project, without inferred criminal status or residence pins.

v1.1 · Native-agent bridge (local-only)

Enroll an independently installed defensive sensor and create a one-time token. Windows ETW/WFP, Linux eBPF, and macOS EndpointSecurity are adapter targets, not included kernel collectors. Never put agent tokens in public scripts.

Token is shown once. Connect only a trusted local agent under your control.

v1.1 · Continuous defensive log integration (opt-in)

Enroll a local JSONL log written by an existing Suricata, Zeek, osquery, Sysmon-export or journald-export collector. Manual polls or a separately started local background tailer. No packet interception or privileged kernel sensor is installed.

Log paths are restricted to user-approved roots. The collector needs an already working sensor and appropriate permissions.

v1.1 · Denmark publisher data (explicit sync)

Fetch actual STRAF11 aggregate observations from Statistics Denmark, using variable codes from the publisher's latest TABLEINFO. Or fetch authenticated municipality polygons using your Datafordeler key. Data and original revisions stay local.

Data requests require network access and correct publisher permissions. Source records must be created first.

v1.1 · Scheduled official aggregate updates

Save an update job using the STRAF11 variables above and the selected matching crime-source record. It runs only after you start tools/official_sync.py on your own PC.

No automatic network requests from the web interface.

v1.1 · Local forensic file integrity manifests

Explicitly hash a user-selected directory (bounded, read-only) and preserve a verified evidence manifest. This is not memory acquisition or certified forensic imaging.

No files are modified or uploaded.

Local security readiness — self-check, not certification

Inspect audit integrity, local file permissions and explicitly outstanding certifications. No independent security approval is implied.

v1.20 · ENGINEERING EVIDENCE

Production Readiness Lab

Review the eight remaining external acceptance gates. This screen cannot issue a certificate or deploy a kernel driver.

Acceptance and certification gates

Safe network IPS rule preview

Generates a non-executed nftables example for a private test environment. It cannot alter the Debian firewall. Save and review the rollback plan before any manual deployment.

No policy has been applied.

Offline evidence acquisition and Danish municipality review

Forensic file/block-device copying and 98-municipality GeoJSON validation are available as operator-only CLI functions on the Debian host. They are deliberately not exposed through the web API. See docs/V120_OPERATIONS.md.

LOCAL DATA ASSURANCE · DEFENSIVE

Telemetry Integrity & Audit

Verify locally retained SIEM event hashes, signed endpoint sequence continuity, and audit-chain records. No raw event bodies or API keys are displayed.

Current project integrity

Altered queued events are quarantined before normalization. Snapshot reports are append-only and linked by local hashes; a privileged attacker controlling the database can still rewrite the chain.

Issues for review

Signed sensor batch continuity

Sequence gaps may indicate missing ledger records. This cannot prove that a compromised sensor reported all activity.

Saved assurance evidence

Choose a snapshot to verify integrity.

Independent certification remains outstanding.

OPT-IN · SELF-HOSTED TRANSPORT

Cross-Node SIEM Relay

HMAC-authenticated Redis Streams relay for authorized, user-controlled machines. No public data upload or executable agent commands.

Durable delivery receipts

This view displays metadata from previously processed relay messages. Actual transport is configured in the operator CLI with a trusted Redis service and secret stored outside project data. No Redis client is started when you open this screen.

Not a high-availability certification.

Transport and deployment boundaries

Outbound publishers do not receive a durable database acknowledgement from Redis XADD alone. Consumers acknowledge a stream item only after local SQLite staging or digest-only rejection has been committed. Restart recovery uses Redis consumer-group pending entries.

The Redis broker requires its own TLS, ACLs, backups and network restrictions. Local project UUIDs must be explicitly mapped. See docs/V118_RELAY_OPERATIONS.md. This is an optional relay transport; full distributed search, high availability and automatic failover are still not certified.

LOCAL SIEM ENGINEERING

SIEM Shards & Sensor Quality

Optional project-sharded processing on one Debian SQLite directory and passive review of user-supplied network sensor logs. No automatic scanning or prevention actions.

Local worker leases

Project shards are opt-in. Stop the legacy worker before running the new worker mode. Different shard layouts are mutually exclusive. This is local multi-process coordination, not distributed SIEM or high availability.

Checking local worker state.

Passive Suricata / Zeek / osquery sample review

Upload a local JSONL excerpt (maximum 2 MiB) to check event types, timestamps and malformed records. Source event bodies are discarded after analysis. This does not validate sensor authenticity or import events into the SIEM.

No sample reviewed.
ENDPOINT DELIVERY ASSURANCE

Signed Sensor Delivery

Optional HMAC-SHA256 authenticated event batches from enrolled Windows, Linux and macOS sensors. This validates a shared-secret message, not kernel code, device identity or certification.

Project-scoped agent delivery status

A missing sequence is rejected rather than silently skipped. Already accepted identical retries are acknowledged without duplicating SIEM events. Server-side batch hashes and receipt sequence numbers are retained; API secrets are never displayed.

Select a project to see enrolled sensors.

Windows-to-Debian test workflow

Enroll a sensor in the existing agent workbench and copy its one-time token into the Windows process environment. Export normalized local events to a JSON array, then use tools/signed_agent_v116.py sign with sequence 1, and send through your existing SSH tunnel. Retain a signed batch file after any unsuccessful delivery.

This is opt-in. It does not install kernel sensors or operate an inline firewall. The original token-protected legacy intake remains available for backward compatibility.

Native readiness & Denmark assurance

Offline forensic metadata, Danish map source checks, worker coordination, and external acceptance gates. This screen does not certify the product or deploy kernel drivers.

Deployment and assurance gates

Engineering status is not certification.

Offline memory-dump metadata review

User-supplied regular file on the Debian server only. No live memory acquisition, memory contents, credentials, or process secrets are displayed.

No file inspected.

Operator-attested DAGI 98-municipality source

Requires an existing project source snapshot with all 98 structurally valid polygons. Hash matching is not proof of publisher identity, licensing, or geographic accuracy.

No dataset attestation recorded.
LOCAL FORENSICS · NETWORK POLICY · ACCEPTANCE EVIDENCE

Forensic Timelines & Policy Lab

Preserve user-provided forensic timeline files, simulate network-policy impact against existing telemetry, and record engineering evidence for the 326 acceptance criteria.

Case-linked forensic timeline

Import small UTF-8 CSV/JSONL files with timestamp, summary, and optional host, category, artifact. Data stays on this Debian server. No disk or memory acquisition is performed.

No timeline selected.

Network policy impact — simulation only

Review which historical network events match a CIDR and optional port. This never installs rules, captures packets, or blocks devices.

No firewall changes can be made from this workbench.

326-requirement engineering evidence

Append-only project notes can record work and outstanding external review. This interface cannot declare a product independently certified.

All unverified acceptance requirements remain open for professional review.
DEFENSIVE SECURITY EVENT PIPELINE

Security Operations

Normalized event ingestion, rule-based detection, local alerts and explicit event archives.

Security events
—
Open alerts
—
High / critical
—
Cases
—

Local collection — explicit opt-in

Poll visible process creation and remote connection changes using psutil; baseline observations are not reported as new. No packet capture.

OFF · No background collection

Security event ingestion

Import locally supplied JSONL or CSV, including normalized events, Suricata EVE exports and Zeek JSON logs. No remote scanning or collection.

Current release: up to 5,000 records per CSV/JSONL file. Explicit archive becomes Parquet when PyArrow is installed.

Passive classic PCAP v2.4 (Ethernet/RAW IP, IPv4/v6 TCP/UDP). Only header metadata is indexed; raw payloads are not uploaded or stored by this action.

Local file-integrity monitoring · opt-in

Select a folder on your own PC to observe file creation, modification and deletion using permission-aware filesystem polling. Only metadata and hashes of changed small files are recorded; there is no kernel driver.

OFF · No file monitoring

Recent events

No events

Detection alerts

Triage an alert

Create detection rule

Active detection rules

CASE MANAGEMENT & EVIDENCE PROVENANCE

Cases & Evidence

Investigation cases, linked alerts, source-labelled file artifacts, SHA-256 checks, report export.

Open investigation

Case status and export

Investigation registry

Acquire local evidence

Local artifact is copied, hashed, indexed and placed in a read-only file when supported. This is not hardware write-blocked forensic acquisition.

Integrity checks

Choose “Static triage” next to an artifact to inspect its offline metadata.

Evidence index

USER-PROVIDED THREAT INTELLIGENCE

Threat Indicators

Source-attributed indicators: IPv4/IPv6, domain and SHA-256. Exact matches in newly imported events generate alerts.

Add an indicator

Matching model

Matching is exact for normalized IP address, domain or SHA-256 in events ingested after adding the indicator. A match is an investigative lead, not proof of compromise.

Feed ingestion, STIX/TAXII enrichment, allowlists, aging and confidence scoring are not yet available.

Local indicators

ON-DEVICE INVENTORY · EVIDENCE TRAIL

Inventory & Audit

Visible interfaces and listening sockets on your own PC, plus a hash-linked local activity ledger.

Visible listening TCP sockets

Local network interfaces

Audit-chain verification

Run verification to check stored entries.

Hash linking detects ordinary record tampering but does not prevent a privileged local actor from rewriting the database and the whole chain.

DENMARK · INVESTIGATION KNOWLEDGE GRAPH

Entity Relationships

Link records already in your project, with source attribution and analyst uncertainty notes.

Create sourced relationship

Research standard

Links represent analyst-supplied or documented relationships, not automatically verified personal associations. Keep facts, hypotheses and uncertainty distinct.

Create entity records in “Intelligence Cases” before linking them.

Project relationship records

Create local project

Projects are stored in a folder under your computer's local application data directory.